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Summary  findings
Corporatization,  a hybrid between public sector  laws and regulations.
ownership and privatization, is an organizational form  *  An understanding of mechanisms of risk sharing and
that is increasingly being adopted in the social sectors. In  high-powered incentives created from the bottom up can
the health sector, the high costs of public hospitals, new  inform the design of corporatized organizations.
technological developments, changes in demand for  * Key to good design are decision rights complemen-
primary and secondary health care, and efficiency  tarities that provide the most complete (and flexible)
considerations have necessitated shifts in organizational  contract possible, regardless of where ownership lies.
boundaries, leading to conversions in hospital ownership.  In designing systemwide institutions for
In the past decade hospitals have been converted from  corporatization,  Eid argues, risk transfer is important in
public to nonprofit  and from nonprofit  to for-profit in  satisfying the two most important  objectives of the
industrial and developing countries alike.  reform. The first objective is establishing hard budget
The debate around these conversions has centered  constraints to control sectoral costs. At HDB, the
mostly on the tradeoff between equity and efficiency  decision right to raise revenue through user fees was
involved in the shift from public to private provision of  complemented by decision rights that created
services. Eid argues that more important  than this dicho-  accountability and legal liability. Together, these decision
tomy is creating appropriate incentives and matching  rights kept spending within HDB's means-in  contrast
incentives with goals through  institutional design.  with international experience with corporatization,
Because corporatization  combines elements of both  where budget deficits have been a perennial problem.
private and public ownership, it is difficult to design.  However, the informality of the decision rights
Among the challenges is deciding where on the spectrum  precluded the exercising of those created to design it slg-
from a budgetary unit to a privatized enterprise a  term financial policy, resulting in timid capital
hospital should lie. Another challenge is aligning  expenditure plans.
incentives-not  just within the hospital but also between  The second important objective of corporatization is
the hospital and the ministry of health.  improving hospital performance, including providing
Eid draws on the decision rights approach to analyze  better service at a low cost for the patient. Eid argues
how an innovative hospital in Lebanon, H6pital Dahr El-  that high-powered incentives are key. Among the most
Bachek (HDB), corporatized itself and became the best in  interesting of HDB's decision rights allocations was the
the public sector over a period of seven years. To study  pairing of claimant and control rights to produce high-
HDB's experience, she develops a decision rights analysis  powered incentives for the director. Not surprisingly, the
framework that tracks the formation, evolution, and  most successful examples of corporatization worldwide
dilution of decision rights. She finds that:  have experimented  with incentive schemes for hospital
* There are important lessons from bottom-up,  managers that seek to provide high-powered incentives
demand-driven institutional design that can inform the  in this way.
design of top-down, supply-driven institutions, such as
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Governments  are turning  to  corporatization to  improve  efficiency and
reduce costs in public hospitals.  Corporatization is a hybrid organizational form
that  grants  hospitals (varying) degrees of  financial  and managerial  autonomy,
through  a corporate board, but retains public sector ownership of the hospitals.
Lying mid-way along a continuum of hospital organizational boundaries, ranging
from budgetary units to privatization, corporatization has become an increasingly
common reform in response to changes in medical technology, know-how, and
cost.  Today, numerous industrialized and developing countries are experimenting
with  the  separation  of  funding  from  provision  functions,  with  the  aim  of
improving  efficiency.  These changes  have  resulted  in  two  prominent  trends
worldwide,  vertical  disintegration  and  horizontal  integration  (Robinson  1996,
1999).  In response  to  these  changes, hospital  boards have  evolved  from the
"caretaker"  board  to  the  "strategy-oriented",  "corporate"  board.  Traditional
hospital  governance was mostly hospital focussed and internally oriented.  Since
the late 1980s, it is increasingly healthcare focused and externally oriented, with
the  board  governing  complex  interdependencies  with  market  actors (Shortell,
1989).1
While providing private sector-like incentives is desirable, how to design
appropriate institutions given efficiency, quality and cost objectives is far from
clear.  Consider  the problem of  decision rights  allocations, the subject of this
paper.  In  decentralizing  decision  rights,  we  face  a  trade-off  between
centralization and coordination in aligning the incentives of a hospital with those
of the public health sector.  "Optimal" decision rights allocations are those that
align incentives within the hospital, as well as between the hospital and the MOH
through the pairing of claimant and control rights.  Appropriate risk sharing and
adequacy of the power of incentives given intended outcomes are key to resolving
the coordination problem when decision rights are decentralized. 2
These  conceptual  conclusions  have  been  corroborated  by  empirical
challenges identified in work done on corporatization in recent years  (see, e.g.
Govindaraj  &  Chawla  1996).  However,  contributions  to  date  have  focussed
mostly  on  the  implementation  and  evaluation  of  hospital  corporatization.
Virtually absent from the literature are discussions of the institutional design of
what  is  implemented  - i.e., the  infrastructure  that  underlies  (and  determines)
capacity, then performance.  This paper draws  on conclusions from a  class of
models in organization economics as an analytical lens to understand the problem
of design in corporatization.  Methodologically, the paper is an application of the
decision rights approach to analyzing institutional design.  I develop a new tool
for this purpose -- the Decision Rights Analysis Framework (Appendix B).
To  understand  some  elements  of  good  design  I  provide  an  in-depth
analysis of an innovative and  successful hospital in Lebanon, H6pital Dahr El-
i  A range of hospital governance models has accompanied  these changes over the past  30 years,
summarized in Appendix A.
2  A related paper (Eid 1999b) draws on lessons from the HDB case and agency theory to analyze
system-wide problems in the legal structure of corporatization in the case of Lebanon.
2Bachek  (HDB),  which  acquired  its  own autonomy  quasi-legally beginning  in
1989, and became  touted  as the  "best"  hospital in  the public  sector.  HDB's
experiment with  autonomy was watched  and emulated over  a period of  seven
years.  In  1996, Law #544 was passed to corporatize all public hospitals in the
country  by  granting  them  boards  of  directors  and  financial  and  managerial
autonomy.  However,  partly  because  of  its  quasi-legal  status,  and  partly  fo-
political reasons, very few design lessons from HDB informed the drafting of the
1996 legislation, and important opportunities were missed to draw lessons froni
the  successes  and  shortcomings  of  the  HDB  experiment.  Meanwhile,
implementation difficulties experienced by hospitals corporatized since 1996 have
revealed numerous  design problems in the new legal structure (Implementation
Decrees under Law #544) governing autonomous hospitals, and the Ministry of
Health (MOH) is looking to amend the decrees.  The final section of this paper
draws lessons from the HDB experience to inform the amendment of the hospital
corporatization decrees. 3
I look at this "demand-side" story of institutional design to glean insights
as to  what  a hospital  would do  if it were  free to  alter its  own decision rights
allocations in response to market forces - through "tatonnement", as a firm does.
I  find that in  the "supply"  of  institutions -- or  the design of  institutions  on  a
system-wide level -- risk transfer is important in satisfying arguably the two most
important objectives of corporatization:
*  The establishment of hard budget constraints (to control sectoral costs,
especially since public hospitals account for an average of 65% of MOH
expenditures) - the "macro" side.  For example, at HDB, the creation of
the decision right to raise revenue through user fees was complemented
with a number of decision rights that created a system of accountability.
Combined, these decision rights  served to keep spending patterns within
HDB's  means,  while  the  international  experience  with  corporatization
points to problems of perennial budget deficits.  On the other hand, HDB's
informality precluded the exercising of decision rights  created to design
long-term  financial  policy,  and  therefore  kept  capital  investment  an(i
development plans timid.
*  The  provision  of  high-powered  incentives  (to  improve  overall
performance of a hospital,  including better quality service at low cost for
the patient) -- the "micro"  side.  Among the most interesting of HDB's
decision rights allocations was the pairing of claimant and control rights
resulting  in  high  powered  incentives  for  employees,  most  notably  the
director.  In the private sector, this amounts to the manager owning part of
3  In a policy note submitted to the Minister of Heath in Lebanon in 1998, 1 analyzed the Law on
Public Hospital Autonomy (#544) and its Implementation Decrees, and recommended the amendment of the
decrees. This process is underway.
3the  firm, but  is uncommon  in the public  sector.  The most  successful
examples  of  corporatization  have  experimented  with  compensation
schemes and performance benchmarks for the hospital manager that seek
to approximate this result, as in the case of Catalunia, Spain (Salas, 1996).
In the following section, I provide a discussion of key conclusions from a
class of theories in  organization economics that I use to inform the problem of
institutional  design  in  corporatization.  In  section  three  I  discuss the  natural
experiment I analyzed, and explain the methodology I developed to analyze it, as
well  as the data  I drew on.  I provide an overview of the pre-corporatization
(centralized) decision rights allocations HDB (and all public hospitals) functioned
under in section 4.  In section 5, I describe the demand-driven groups of decision
rights  adopted by HDB, and their evolution and analyze some key examples of
decision rights  complementarities.  In this section, I also discuss some cases of
decision  rights  pairings that were  either inappropriate,  or did not  succeed and
explain why this  was so.  I contrast some of these pairings with the decisions
rights  allocations  established  through  legislation  in  Section  6.  I  draw policy
implications for the design of corporatization in Section 7.
2  Analytical approach
The decision rights  approach derives from a large body  of literature on
agency  theory  and  transaction  costs  that  began to  explore  alternatives to  the
neoclassical, "technological" view of the firm as a production function (see, e.g.,
Chandler 1990).  Among the important issues neoclassical economics is silent on
are  incentive  problems  within the  firm, the hierarchical,  decision-making and
authority structures that govern organizations, as well as their boundaries.  Over
the past 20 years, agency theory has made important contributions to explaining
incentive problems  within organizations (Hart  & Holmstr6m  1987; Holmstr6m
1994;  Laffont  &  Tirole  1993).  The transaction  cost  literature  starting  with
Coase's famous 1937 paper has been developed by Williamson and others and has
contributed the important distinction between  a theoretical contract and  a real,
incomplete  contract.  Building  on the idea  of  contractual  incompleteness, the
transaction costs approach resulted in explorations of the costs and consequences
of renegotiation, asset specificities and the hold-up problem (see e.g. Dewatripont
1989; Klein  et al. 1978; Fudenberg &  Tirole  1991; Meyerson  &  Satterthwaite
1983 and Joskow 1985).
The decision rights approach contributes an explanation of organizational
change, namely what happens when firms merge or de-integrate.  Because of its
focus on the micro-dimensions  of organizational change, this  approach has the
potential of shedding new light on old questions about the public sector, such as
why  and  when  decentralization  is  desirable,  and  exactly  what  happens  to
incentives  and  performance  when  a public  agency  is  decentralized.  Cremer,
Estache and Seabright (1995), Tommassi & Saiegh (1999), and Schwager (1999)
are among the  new  explorers of  this  vein  of  the  decision  rights  literature  to
4understanding public sector organization.  Eid (1996) was written with the same
objective.
The decision rights approach assumes that all contractual arrangements are
by definition incomplete because it is impossible to  account, ex ante, for every
possible contingency.  Given contractual incompleteness, "residual control right"
allocations are critical. 4 A basic premise of the decision rights approach is that
organizations work well when they allocate the authority to make decisions to the
agents best informed to make them.  Incentives also have to be correctly aligned,
between principals  and agents, otherwise those  with the information can make
decisions  that  are in  their  interest,  but  not  necessarily  in  the  interest  of  the
organizations to which they belong.  Key to aligning incentives is the pairing of
control rights  with claimant rights -- the entitlement to receive any net income
that a given asset (or firm) produces.  Typically, the asset owner is entitled to the
income that remains from revenues after all expenses, debts and other contractual
obligations have been paid off.  This net income is the "residual return" (Milgrom
& Roberts  1992).  If the residual claimant also has residual control, then he/she
will be led to make efficient decisions just  by maximizing his/her own returns.
When decision rights are paired in this way, decision rights allocations are said to
be "optimal" for maintaining and increasing the value of the asset or organization
in question.5 Changes in  organizational boundaries,  say from  centralization to
decentralization, are accompanied by changes in formal and informal rules that
allocate  control  rights.  These  allocations,  in  turn,  distribute  power  within
organizations, and affect the incentives agents have to perform and innovate.
These findings are corroborated by a class of models in organization and
information economics that have explored the implications of a range of agency
problems, power and authority in firns,  and organizational boundaries.  Common
to these models is the conclusion that autonomy (or firm de-integration) entails
risk and high powered incentives, sometimes in the form of claimant status.  In
the public sector, on the other hand, we tend to see centralization (integration),
little or no risk transfer, and low powered incentives with no claimant status.  This
paper  shows  how  one  public  sector  agency  developed  its  own  autonomous
structure by assuming high levels of risk and creating high powered incentives,
based partly on the pairing of control and claimant rights.
Although the decision rights approach has contributed important analytical
lenses for understanding organizations, few empirical tools have been developed
to  draw  on  the  insights  the  approach  offers.  There  have  been  even  fewer
applications of this  approach to the public  sector despite the importance  of the
4  'Residual  control  rights' over  an asset are defined  by Hart (1995)  as "the right to decide  all usages
of the asset  in any way not inconsistent  with a prior contract,  custom,  or law ... possession  of residual  control
rights is taken virtually  to be the definition  of ownership  ... in contrast  to the more standard  definition  of
ownership,  whereby an owner possesses  the residual income from an asset rather than its residual  control
rights" (pp.30).  Residual control rights are also referred to as 'decision rights' by Holmstr6m  (1995),
Milgrom  and Roberts (1992), and Kreps (1992).  The latter, shorter terrn is used more frequently  in this
paper.
5  For a discussion  of the relevance  of this approach  to health,  see  Harding  & Preker  (1999).
6  This  is partly  due to the fact that social scientists  in the past two decades  have  been more  concerned
with  model  "testing"  than  with the use of models  as analytical  lenses.
5issue  (Dixit  1996, Hart  1995; Tirole  1994, Williamson  1997).  The study  of
hybrid organizational forms like corporatization offers an opportunity to focus on
some new dimensions of ownership in the public sector. Among these is the issue
of incentive alignment through institutional design, regardless of where ownership
lies.
This  paper  develops  a  framework  for  applying  the  decision  rights
approach to show how HDB selectively adopted the decision rights necessary for
it to improve its performance over time (as demonstrated through its productivity
and activity figures). 7  The study compares decision rights allocations before and
after HDB  was corporatized.  To get at the full picture,  this  analysis will also
show how some decision rights would have been desirable, but were not adopted
because it would not  have been "optimal"  for HDB to adopt them at the time,
because  of systemic, process,  and capacity constraints.  Examples  of systemic
constraints were unpredictable  public sector financing, and  contradictory MOH
policies.  Such factors contributed to fluctuations in HDB's  liquidity. _The most
important process constraint was the fact the director had appointed the ALSM,
while the process tends to be the reverse in normal boards.  As a result, the ALSM
had limited power over the director, and many decision rights  that it sought to
adopt and implement were diluted, and the ALSM allowed them to be reallocated
or abandoned.  Capacity constraints, such as weak middle management capacity,
also  precluded  HDB  from  adopting  the  full  set  of  decision  rights  originally
envisioned.  The secret to HDB's  sustainability was in reaching  an equilibrium
that maximized HDB's  objective function subject to these constraints.  In turn,
lack of  careful  consideration  of  such  constraints  and  others  have  resulted  in
problems  with  the  implementation  of  the  centrally  designed,  national  public
hospital structure under Law #544, as will be discussed in section 6.
3  Why HDB is an interesting phenomenon
After  15 years  of  war,  the  Lebanese  Ministry  of  Health  had  severely
limited financial and technical capacities to operate its public hospitals.  During
the  last two  years  of  this  war,  and  over  a  period  of  7years,  HDB  began  to
transform itself from a 15-bed hospital providing small surgery and basic medical
treatment,  to  a  110-bed  hospital  that  offers  a  range  of  services,  from
physiotherapy to plastic surgery.  HDB became touted as the "best" hospital in the
public sector.  Although  no detailed comparative  studies have been carried out,
patient demand, as well as basic quality and activity figures confirm that HDB
deserves the reputation it has come to enjoy.  The success of HDB is due to three
important factors:
(1) The  commitment of  those  who headed,  lead,  and  supported  it over
time;
7  Decision Rights Analysis Interview Framework, Appendix B.
6(2) The contributions of its patients who were mostly of the lowest socio-
economic background in the country and;
(3) Donations of NGOs and international organizations, solicited by HDB
patrons.8
Prior to  1996, patients were not obliged to pay for treatment received at
public  hospitals  in  Lebanon 9,  nor  were  hospitals  allowed  to  place  funds  in
commercial bank accounts.  Public hospital funds, along with all MOH budgetary
allocations,  were held by the Treasury.  Under the leadership of an innovative
director, and a supportive minister of health, HDB set up a nonprofit association,
the  Association  Libanaise  de  Soutien  Medico-Hospitalier  (ALSM),  whose  7
members came to  function as a board of directors for the hospital.  Among the
roles it took on, the ALSM became a repository for funds collected through cost
recovery and funneled back into the hospital to supplement operating and capital
expenditures.  The revenue-raising capacity that HDB created for itself was at the
heart of the experiment because it allowed the hospital to make decisions rapid]y
and independently of the central administration over a range of areas of hospital
finance  and  management.1°  Fees  charged  to  patients  ("contributions")  were
placed  in  the  ALSM's  bank  account,  which  then  made  "contributions"  l:o
supplement HDB's  operating and capital expenditures.
When  the  topics  of  politics  and  public  service  delivery  are  discussed
together,  it is usually to illustrate the corrupt influence politicians have on the
public sector."  The case of HDB is an interesting counter-factual where political
influence was crucial to the improvement and continuity of service delivery and,
instead  of  corrupting  the  experiment,  served  to  protect  it.  Perhaps  the  most
important political champion of the experiment was the Minister of Health at the
time who, knowing all too well the inadequacies of his sector, turned a blind eye
to the informal aspects of the budding experiment, allowed the hospital to thrive,
and  flaunted  its  achievements.  The high  profile  acquired  by HDB  helped  to
immunize it from corruption.12
8  Eid (1999d) is a newspaper article that summarizes the history of HDB's trajectory toward success
and presents it as an example of "good" performance in the public sector.
9  Although patient "contributions"  were recommended, according to the text of Decree #325 (1971)
which amended the original decree defining the Organization of the Ministry of Health (#8377,  1961), the
practice was for public hospitals to provide what services they were capable of providing, free of charge.
10  The  inclination  to  innovate,  when  agents  are  given  (or  take)  local  control  is  a  universal
phenomenon that has been shown in theory and in practice.  In a separate paper (Eid 1996) I show how  an
innovative municipal finance program in Chile can be explained using the same conceptual approach applied
in this paper.
I  I  A tradition of literature on rent-seeking in the developing world is replete with such examples (see,
e.g., Krueger 1974).
12  See, e.g., Geddes (1994)  on the importance  of  insulating  public  sector  reformn  initiatives  from
politics.  During his tenure from 1991 till 1996, the Minister of Health visited the hospital at least 11 times,
attended  the ALSM's  social  and fundraising events,  held  press  conferences  from HDB  and invited  one
Swedish  and two  French  ministers  of  health  to  showcase  visits  of  HDB  while  they  were  in  Lebanon
(Intreview with Marwan Hamade, former Minister of Health (13.VIII.98) and ALSM Minutes of Meetings).
7Interestingly, what little political pressure HDB was subject to came in the
forn  of  requests  to  the HDB  director  to  sign  off  on  forms allowing  patient
admissions to private hospitals, under the MOH subsidy system.13 The director
would  sometimes  have to  sign off on  these requests  despite the fact  that the
treatment being sought could be provided by HDB.14 This preference for private
sector treatment was based on the conviction that the public sector was not "good
enough",  and in most  cases  it was not.  Political pressures created a perverse
public sector competition that indirectly hurt HDB and resulted in a decline in its
admissions rates beginning  1995, as activity figures will show.  As far as direct
intervention in HDB activities, non of the local political leaders thought it worth
their while, thereby sparing the HDB experiment as it grew.
3.1  Proflle and setting
HDB has a long and interesting history (Sabbagh, 1987). Founded in 1909
as a tuberculosis sanatorium on a beautiful hill overlooking the coast of Beirut, it
was among the first of its kind in the Middle East.  HDB came to exist thanks to
the efforts of a foundation created and lead by a group of Lebanese and American
philanthropists at a time when American missionary activity had  initiated many
important projects, including  the American University of Beirut.15 Pillaged by
Ottoman troops during World War I, the sanatorium resumed its  activities  and
expanded their scope thanks to the contributions of its patients, many of whom
came from affluent families in the Middle East and the Gulf, and the commitment
of its patrons, including a non-profit foundation started in Boston in the late 1920s
by Lebanese and Syrian immigrants.  By the 1960s, T.B. recovery rates had risen
to 95% (from 25% in the 1920s) and a declining number of affluent patients came
to the sanatorium as the average recovery period dropped from 20 months in the
1940s to four months in the 1960s, and as T.B. was no longer feared and home
care became possible.  By  1971 the sanatorium was no longer able to cover its
costs  and was  donated to  the  government, which  transformed  it into  a public
hospital.
The war in Lebanon started in  1974 and until it ended in 1990, it led to a
progressive  deterioration  in  human and  capital  resources  in  the  public  sector.
Several local  and international humanitarian  agencies took  an  interest  in HDB
during  this  time,  most  notably  the  French  Medecins  du  Monde  which  made
several  capital  donations  to  reconstruct  damaged  buildings.  In  terms  of  the
trajectory of HDB  since the late  1980s Medecins  du Monde's  most  important
13  This was an  emergency  measure  passed during  the  war.  Reform  efforts  are underway  today
because 90% of MOH expenditures go toward private sector cost reimbursement.  The consequences have
ranged from complaints, to over-billing on the part of hospitals, to pressure on the MOH from private sector
pressure groups, to arrears on the part of the MOH to the tune of USD400,000,000.
14  Interview with the former director of HDB.
15  Dahr el-Bachek means "Peak of the Sparrow-Hawk".  Home to this particular specie of fast birds,
this peak is one of many in mountainous Lebanon.
8contribution was the smallest in financial value and the largest in sustainability.  It
was a grant of $127,000 that made possible the creation of a rudimentary one-time
bonus system for staff to encourage them to brave the bullets and come to work.
The idea of creating the ALSM to continue and perfect the system came about at
this time.  During the tail end of the war (1989-90), as the Medecins du Monde
project  was being implemented, the region surrounding HDB was suffering the
worst of Lebanon's war experiences, and HDB doctors often slept at the hospital
in order to keep up with the treatment of casualties admitted.
HDB is located in an area that experienced rapid population growth and
industrialization during the war years (1974-90).  This northern suburb of Beirut
is densely inhabited, and its small industries mostly employ manual workers such
as carpenters, mechanics, tailors and leather workers.  These tend to be uninsured
and  often undeclared  employees (of the informal  sector).  In addition,  a large
proportion of HDB patients  constitute Sri Lankan, Egyptian, Ethiopian servants
laborers working in Lebanon.  Many of these tend to be uninsured.  Finally, in
1994, 15.15% of HDB's  patients lived in remote areas like the Kesrouan (3%),
Byblos  (3.3%)  and  the North  Metn  (3.1%)  and  in  the  South  (3.09%) and  in
Baalbek  and  the  Bekaa  (2.64%), regions  that  had  their  own  public  hospitals
(Jabbour, 1994).  Such patients most certainly came to HDB because they could
not find better treatment at a lower cost elsewhere.  HDB's war year experiences,
combined  with  this  clear  demand  for  its  services  went  far  in  motivating  the
ALSM founders to improve the hospital.
3.2  Research  methodology
This research is based on structured and open-ended interviews, analysis
of documents, minutes of meetings and legislation, and financial analysis based
on  annual  reports  and  financial  statements  from  HDB  and  other  hospitals.
Between March and September of 1998, I benefited from permission to take part
in weekly meetings of the MOH Task Force on Public Hospitals as a participant
observer.'6 My presence  in  these  meetings  was  crucial  to  understanding  the
sectoral and macro dimensions of public hospital reform in Lebanon, and the day-
to-day obstacles encountered in implementation.  During the summer of 1999, I
benefited  from  permission  to  accompany  the  MOH  Ratings  Commission  to
inspect public and private hospitals and assess their standards, HDB included.
During the summer of 1997, a first round of introductory, then open-ended
interviews was carried out with 5 of the seven founding members of the ALSM
and some HDB and  MOH employees as I was exploring doing  this work.'7 I
16  See Pomper (1991) for a review of the benefits and constraints  of participant observation  as a
qualitative  research  method.
17  The founding  members  of the ALSM were Edouard  Abboud (ex officio member  and Director  of
HDB at the time, an ophthalmologist),  Ramez Awad (an orthopedic  surgeon and Dean of the Lebanese
University  Medical School at the time), Bechara Hatem (current president, a lawyer), Michel Matta (a
pediatrician),  Tony  Manasseh  (first president,  a business  man),  Nicolas  Sassine  (a pharmacist),  Georges  Sfeir
(an engineer),  and Joe Saleh (a bank manager).
9conducted another series of interviews with six members of the ALSM during the
summer of  1998 and the summer of  1999, this  time using the Decision Rights
Analysis Interview Framework I had developed during the Spring of 1998.  These
interviews lasted three hours on average, and began with an explanation of the
approach and with definitions of decision rights and decision rights allocations to
ensure that interviewees had a uniform understanding of both the approach and
the questions.  Two criteria were used to determine who held a decision right:
(a) If the director held the decision right over a given area, he could make
changes, either without informing the ALSM at all, or by informing
them only after changes had been made;
(b) If  the  ALSM  held  the  decision  right,  they would  make  decisions
during  ALSM  meetings,  and  the  director  could  not  proceed  in
implementing anything related to the decision without having received
the result of the discussion by the ALSM.
Typically, the director was party to all discussions as ex officio member of
the ALSM, so he can be considered to have been a co-holder of most rights, some
more strongly than others depending on how much influence he had  over final
decisions made,  and whether he  abided by  decisions taken.  He was the sole-
holder of most decision rights internal to the management of the hospital.
To track the evolution of decision rights allocations over time, each of the
boxes  in  the Decision  Rights Analysis  Interview Framework  was divided into
three  rows  representing  the  periods  1991-1992,  1993-1995,  and  1996-1997,
respectively.  To  determine the  degree of  influence  each of  the  actors in  the
columns (ALSM (SC), HDB Director, MOH, Other) had over the decision right
(and ultimately who held the decision right), one, two, or three pluses were placed
in the row.  For example, if the interviewee believed that the director co-held the
decision right with the ALSM over a certain matter with equal influence, I wrote
two pluses on each side, for the period at hand.  If the interviewee felt that the
director was a fairly weak co-holder, and the ALSM had more influence over a
given issue (i.e., the ALSM could proceed with the decision even if the director
disagreed), I wrote one plus in the box for the director, and two or three pluses in
the box for the ALSM, or vice versa.
Interestingly, for 95% of decisions rights  analyzed, all interviewees were
in agreement over who the principal holders were, and how the right evolved over
the 7-year period.  Where there were contradictions in answers, I conducted two
sorts  of  follow-up  interviews.  One  with  other  members  of  the  ALSM  who
disagreed on either the decision rights allocation or its evolution, and one with an
HDB staff member who interacted with the ALSM and the Director on the issue
at hand.  For example, if the contradiction arose with respect to an area of finance,
I  interviewed  the  HDB  accountant  to  explain  the  difference  - an  approach
sometimes referred  to  as "triangulation"  (Yin,  1994).  I  sought  to  understand
whether  the  contradiction  was  due  to  a  data-gathering  failure  or  to  the
10idiosyncrasies of personalities and differential perceptions and experiences on the
part of interviewees.  In all such cases, I was able to refine the manner in which
the data were collected either by re-posing the question or by posing it differently,
or to attribute the contradiction to personality and temperament.  The total number
of interviews carried out with ALSM members was 24, averaging three hours in
duration.
The second most important source of data were seven years of minutes of
meetings  that  took  place  twice  per  month  during  the  first 4  years,  and  with
decreasing frequency after that.  A total of 143 documents averaging three typed
pages  in  length  (excluding  annexes),  these  minutes  were  methodically  and
professionally kept, and constitute a rare and valuable window onto the evolution
of  public  sector  institutions.18 Similarly methodically  kept  were  a  treasurer's
ledger, purchase orders, and files of receipts, all of which were used to produce
audits and annual reports by a professional accounting firm. The ALSM also kept
detailed personnel rosters and employee absence information.  Also used in this
paper were various reports written by HDB and MOH/World Bank staff on HDB
and on other public hospitals.
In  addition,  I  conducted  a  total  of  25  interviews  with  HDB  middle
managers, the former and current director,  and doctors and nurses currently or
previously connected with HDB.  I carried out 20 interviews with MOH central
administration  staff  from  the  Procurement,  Public  Hospitals,  Medical  Care,
Accounting,  and Directorate  General divisions.  Finally,  I interviewed the two
forner  and current Ministers of Health and a total of 4 of their advisors.
In Lebanon, there are  17 public hospitals in all, of which six  are being
corporatized.  Because implementation  of the reform only began last year, and
because of lack of data in public hospitals in general, experimental design using
IIDB as a "control" is not feasible.  Instead, my examination of HDB's  trajectory
is designed as a "reflexive  comparison" that compares HDB to itself before and
after its self-induced corporatization program, using time-series quantitative and
qualitative data from 1988 until  1997.  Given that HDB was the leading edge of
change in the Lebanese public hospital sector -- by definition a non-representative
case -- the objective behind this research is neither to  suggest that the case be
replicated not to generalize from the case to the population.  Instead, this research
seeks to discern key elements that can inform the theory, and to generalize from
case to concept  (Yin  1994), in particular the institutional  design as defined by
Law #544 and its Implementation Decrees.' 9
18  Each set of these minutes begins with a list of members present, then lists an agenda, then itemized
discussions of the agenda, and concludes with a financial report from the treasurer.
19  This  paper  adopts  North's  (1990)  distinction  between  "institutions"  and  "organizations".
Institutions are the formal and informal rules that shape interaction.  They range from constitutions, to laws,
to common practice to corporate culture (Kreps  1993).  Organizations  are groups of individuals bound by
some common purpose to achieve a given set of objectives.  They include political,  economic,  social and
educational bodies.  In this paper, a hospital is an organization.  The law and decrees governing the operation
of the hospital are a set of institutions.
114.  Mapping  of  pre-corporatization decision  rights  allocations  for  all
public hospitals
For the four main  areas of hospital management  and finance  (Finance,
Human  Resource Management, Procurement, Service Delivery).  A set of pre-
corporatization  (centralized)  decision  rights  allocations  governed  all  public
hospitals in the country until 1996.  Each of the sections below will map out the
principal set of decision rights, discuss who their holders  and co-holders were,
and  what  the implications  of the institutional design were  on the operation of
public hospitals in Lebanon.  This analysis will show that most  decision rights
were held by administrative units above the level of public hospitals, and that the
latter had  little leeway to  adapt to,  or respond to  changes in  local demand for
public health delivery.
4.1  Finance
The principal holder of decision rights over all matters related to finance
in  public  hospitals  was  the  Ministry  of  Finance,  in  particular  the  Treasury
Department and the Budget Office.  These decision rights were allocated through
two  principal  institutions:  The  Public  Accounting  Law  and  the  annually
promulgated Budget Law 20.
The Public Accounting Law defines the procedures for the formulation of
the government budget, and spells out its main components.  The Budget Law
supplements it, specifying the details of the budget by sector and by item.  These
laws govern all government agencies, public hospitals included.  They determine:
*  Expenditures, ranging from allocation to disbursement;
*  Revenues,  including  taxation  and  other  extractive  instruments  and
collection of owed and outstanding public fiscal obligations.
As far as public hospitals are concerned, the co-holders of decision rights
over  finance within  the  MOH were  the Department  of  Medical  Care  and  the
Procurement Department.  According to the letter of the law, the Department of
Medical  Care  received  proposed  budgets  from  public  hospitals,  aligned  and
incorporated them with its own budget, and submitted them to the Procurement
Department.  The  Procurement  Department  then  made  further  adjustments  to
proposed budgets based on allocations in previous years, and forwarded them on
to  the Accounting Department  for  final incorporation  into  the sectoral  budget
proposal.  The law  does not provide  for instances where  budgets proposed by
public hospitals  are not  found acceptable by  the Department  of  Medical Care
because, in practice, there was no negotiation between these two parties over the
20  The Public Accounting Law is defined by Decree # 14969 (1963).  Section #2 of this decree
specifies the procedures for the preparation of the annual Budget Law.
12budget under this system.  The fact that no formal mechanism was defined in the
law for agreement on a final budget between the Department and the hospital left
the final decision up to the discretion of the Department of Medical Care and to
the Procurement Department - equal co-holders of this decision right.  In practice,
some hospitals (along with other MOH units) had the capacity and discipline to
submit budget proposals and others not.  As a result, the system did not ensure
careful consideration of real changes in demand.  Figure 4a. depicts the budget
preparation process of public hospitals under the old system.
Figure 4a.  The dejure  hospital budget preparation process, pre-corporatization 2 1
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In  practice,  information  obtained  through  interviews  indicates  that  the
system described here was even more centralized in practice than it was de jure
for the following reasons.  More often than not, partly because of emergency and
crisis-management exigencies during the war and a gradual loss of public sector
capacity for planning, sectoral expenditure ceilings were pre-set by the Ministry
of Finance  without  careful  consideration  of need  in each sector.  In the  case  of the
MOH,  for instance,  once  the Minister's  office  received  the budget  figures  for  the
sector,  an  ex post  allocation  of expenditures  was  made  to  the  various  budgetary
units in the sector,  hospitals  included.
The  process  was  not  only  irregular  and  granted  few  decision  rights  to
public  hospitals,  it  also  tended  to  be  even  more  centralized,  and  granted  a
constrained set  of decision rights  over  finance to  the MOH itself.  It  is better
schematized in the following way:
21  Thc nuances between  directorates,  departments,  divisions  and services within the public
administration  have  not been translated  from Arabic,  because the hierarchies  they denote do not provide
significant  additional  information  to the discussion.  Instead,  the term  "department"  has been  used for all
of  fices. Readers  faniiliar  with  the Lebanese  public  sector  will  know  the  differences.
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4.2  Human resource management
The Decree on Personne,22  defines eligibility, grades and pay-scales for all
public  sector  employees.  This  decree  defines  a  basic  set  of  public  service
responsibilities, guidelines for the disbursement of remuneration, bonuses, family
and expense  allowances, promotion  criteria, disciplinary measures,  completion
and termination  of  employment  severance pay,  and retirement  for both  career
appointments and fixed-term employment (i.e. of contractuals, seasonal workers
and casual wage  workers).  The decree  allocates  all decision rights  over  such
matters to the Civil Service Board, a central body that hires,  assigns, promotes,
disciplines and terminates civil servants.  Co-holders of these decision rights, with
varying degrees  of  influence are  sectoral  ministers, who  formally  recommend
appointments.  Ministers'  decisions  are,  in  principal,  based  upon
recommendations  of  the their  directors general  (or "DG"  --  the administrative
heads of the sectors) and/or division directors (middle managers).  In practice, the
DGs  are  fairly weak  co-holders of  this  decision right  because  the  amount of
influence they wield is partly determined by their relationship with the Minister,
and the  politico-sectarian  determinants  of  the DG's  appointment.  The  MOH
Decree also delegate some decision rights  over personnel to  the Department of
Medical  Care, but none  to  hospitals.  Hospitals, like all other budgetary units,
could make requests and recommendations for personnel matters, but they could
not make decisions in this area. All hospital recommendations and requests could
be superceded by the hierarchy beginning with the Department of Medical Care
and ending with the Minister of Health, the Civil Service Board and the Council
of Ministers.
Given  this  centralization  of  decision  rights  over  personnel,  sectoral
legislation is limited to determining the number and type of employees to be hired
in  various  units,  including  hospitals  under  the  centralized  system.  Although
relatively  minor  in  the  overall  scheme  of  things,  this  role  of  the  MOH  in
22  Decree  #112  (1959),  defining  the  Organization  of Personnel  in  the  public  sector.
14personnel matters added to the rigidity of the system.  For example, the decree 23
that set the organizational structure and functions of the MOH, determined the
exact  number  of positions  and  specializations  for  each public  hospital  in  the
country,  beginning  with  the  hospital  director  down  to  hospital  drivers  and
housekeeping staff.  All personnel matters in the MOH are handled by a Personnel
Section that is part of the Office of the Minister (Diwan), however, this section's
decision  rights  have  more to  do  with  the  processing  of  information  and  the
documentation  of recommendations than with policy  formulation and decision-
making.
4.3  Procurement
The  MOH  Decree  also  provides  for  a  Procurement  Division,  whose
functions epitomized the centralization of the ministry under the pre-corporatized
system.  ALL decision rights over the procurement of non-labor inputs used by
public hospitals in producing health services were held by this department.  These
inputs ranged from high-tech laboratory and surgical equipment to the provision
of  maintenance  services,  to  the  procurement  of  stationary  and  pencils.  In
addition, this department also held decision rights over some extremely important
areas, such as the preparation of budget proposals made by MOH administrative
units,  including public  hospitals, and the management  of two  important MOH
central  stocks and  of their  deliveries.  These  are (a)  the capital inputs  depot,
including medical  equipment and  supplies, and; (b) the medicine depot, which
supplies all drugs for all uses in public health provision in Lebanon.  All inputs
were centrally procured and stored in these units before they were distributed to
relevant units in the public health sector.
4.4  Service delivery
Similarly, decision rights over the organizational structure and functions
of public hospitals were determined by the MOH Decree.  This decree defined the
internal organization, service mix and number of beds for each public hospital in
the country.  How well the actual state of affairs approximated what was laid out
in the law was variable.  For example, the number of beds hospitals had varies
significantly from what was specified in the decree, especially in terms numbers
of operational beds. 24
Table  4.4  summarizes  the  centralized  decision  rights  allocation  that
prevailed  in  the  MOH  at  the  time  when  HDB  launched  it  corporatization
experiment.  Under each of the four areas of hospital finance  and management
discussed above, the table details the principal set of relevant decision rights, and
23  Decree # 8377 (1961) defining the Organization of Ministry of Health (also referred to as the MOH
Decree in this paper).
24  Information obtained from the Directorate of Medical Care, MOH, July 1999.
15identifies their holders.  The column "Not Held" refers to areas where the decision
right did not exist altogether.
Table 4.4: Centralized  decision rights allocations  governing  public hospitals pre-
1996
Ministry  Civil  Service  Ministy  Public  Not
:  of Finance  I Board  I ofHealth  Hospitas  Held
Finance
Solicitation  of outside  funds  X
Allocation  of outside  funds  x
Fee setting  for services  x
Exemption  policy  _  x
Fee collection  I  X*  I  X*  I
Allocation  of fee revenue  x
Human  Resource  Ma agement
Hiring  X 
Promotion  X  _
Discipline  L  x  I
Firing  I  _  r  x  _
Procurement
Medical  consumables  1  _  X
Other  consumables  _  x  X
Major  medical  equipment  x  X
Other fixed  equipment  x  x  X
Service  Delivery
Range of services  x  _
Quality  control  x  x  _
Community  outreach  x
Coordination  with  other  x
hospitals  I  I
Note: The presence  of two Xs  in one row indicates  that a decision  right  was co-held.
*This  decision  right existed  (and  was co-held)  but was  generally  not implemented.
Source: Author's construction  based on Law #14969, Decrees  #112, #8377,  #325 and the discussion  in
Section  4.
5.  Mapping of HDB decision rights reallocations, post-corporatization
For each of the areas below,  this  section will describe:  (i) the decision
rights allocations adopted by HDB and; (ii) the manner in which decision rights
were distributed to create complementarities in certain areas. 25 This part of the
analysis will take into consideration decision rights changes considered, but not
adopted and will evaluate why this occurred.
25  To illustrate  the notion of complementarity,  take two types of assets,  al  and a2 (located  in firm I
and firm 2 respectively).  These  assets are strictly  complementary  either  if access  to al alone  has no effect  on
the manager  of firms  I's marginal  return  from investment  (i.e., if he needs  a2 as well),  or if access  to a2 alone
has no effect  on the manager  of firm 2's marginal  return from investment  (i.e., he needs  al as well). Assets
al  and a2 are independent  if access to a2 will not increase  the manager of firm l's  marginal  return from
investment  if he already has access to al,  and if access to al  will not increase the manager of firm2's
marginal  return  from investment  if he already  has access  to a2. This  paper adopts  the same  logic for decision
rights  complementarities.
16A procedural simplification characteristic of HDB's  trajectory was one of
the  first  breaks  given  by  the  Minister  of  Health  to  the  hospital.  This
simplification came in the form of an official exemption from some centralized
administrative procedures.  Through special permission, the Minister of Health
allowed HDB to skip two levels of regional bureaucracy (the District Doctor and
the Provincial  Representative of the MOH) and to  conduct its business directly
with the central administration of the MOH. 26 This step paved the way for the
close relationship HDB developed with the MOH under the governance of the
ALSM.
Inasmuch as it is possible to generalize over a period of 7 years, the first
two years  of HDB's  experiment with autonomy were  anomalous.  Because  of
their novelty, these years were surrounded by much enthusiasm and motivation
from all those involved in HDB.  During this period of "super-normal" zeal, the
ALSM  used  to  meet  every other Monday, and  follow  up  in between  through
meetings  with  public  sector  officials  and  donor  agencies,  and  smaller
(subcommittee)  meetings  that would  sometimes take  place  on  Sundays.  Also
during this period, the wives of ALSM members were invited to form a Ladies
Auxiliary.  They would wear their specially ordered aprons and alternate carefully
scheduled shifts to ensure all-day presence in running the hospital cafeteria they
had re-opened.  They would also carry out hygiene spot checks in hospital wards.
During this period, a large number of decision rights were created, some of which
were  not  fully  adopted,  and  others  were  reassigned  and/or  diluted  over  time
because their initial allocation was not tenable.  HDB's  equilibrium for decision
rights allocation was reached approximately three years after the ALSM began its
work, for two reasons:
1.  The  fact that  the  HDB  experience developed  through  what  might  best  be
described as "tatonnement": there was no model or pre-determined design for
autonomy, nor were the limits and constraints predictable or constant;
2.  The only legitimacy the experiment enjoyed emanated  from the undeniable
improved productivity of the hospital and its concomitant reputational effects,
from the credibility of the individuals involved, and the good relations they
forged with the Ministry of Health.
Key to the manner in which HDB arrived at its decision rights equilibrium
was the  distribution of  its  created rights between  the ALSM  and the director.
During  its first two years, the ALSM adopted a very ambitious  and  aggressive
strategy of designing various committees and quality control functions that sought
to  create a quasi-managerial/supervisory role for the ALSM.  These steps were
taken in reaction to severe lacunae in managerial and productive capacity at HDB
at the time, especially in middle management capacity.  However, like a graft that
does not "take", many decision rights were slowly reallocated or abandoned. 27
26  Interview with former HDB Director, August 1999.
27  Overkill is not an uncommon phenomenon when private sector actors take it upon themselves to
improve the public sector.  Out of good intention and enthusiasm, such people often seek to design a Ferrari
when a Fiat  would have been enough  of a first replacement  to the Broken Bicycle  (see, e.g., the experience
with the Presupuesto por Resultado in Mendoza, Argentina, forthcoming in Fuhr (2000).
17The formal justification/explanation of shifts in decision rights allocations
during this period centers around a personality clash between the hospital director
and the president of the ALSM. 28 However, careful analysis of data and minutes
of  meetings  dating back  to  the  years  1990-1993, combined  with  information
obtained  through  structured  interviews  using  the  Decision  Rights  Analysis
Framework, bring to bear a more complex picture.  My analysis of decision rights
reallocations, in particular, reveals that some of the roles the ALSM tried to take
on (such as supervisory and management roles) were not tenable, despite the fact
that they were necessary.  These rights were not tenable because HDB did not
have the middle management necessary to implement them, as will be explained
in more  detail below.  Nor did  some of the decision rights the ALSM tried to
acquire square with  the conventional functions of even the most  aggressive of
hospital boards.  Interestingly, by 1993, the equilibrium reached at HDB was very
much  along  the  lines  of  the  "corporate"  board  of  a  competitive  hospital
(summarized  in  Appendix  A).  The  director  was  in  charge  of  day-to-day
decisions.  The  ALSM  set  the  envelope  for HR  expenditures,  discussed  and
cleared senior staff HR matters such as new appointments, bonuses and contract
renewals and terminations.
On the other hand, my analysis of decision rights allocations also makes
clear that some important functions were not adopted because the informality of
the experience precluded their implementation.  For example, while most boards
can  wield  authority  over  the  director  partly  because  he/she  is  selected  and
employed  by  them,  at HDB  the  situation  was  the reverse.  The  director  had
personally invited five of the seven members of the ALSM to serve on the board.
Instead of being determined ex ante, the distribution of decision rights between
the ALSM and director was the result of negotiations that waned, but continued
almost until the very end.  Typically, in struggles between the director and the
ALSM  over  decision  rights  allocations  and  the  exercise  of  decision  rights
throughout  the  seven-year period,  the informational  advantage of  the director
dominated (Interviews with ALSM members).  Also, this tenure was a long one
by most  measures, and it was fairly intense at the beginning and near the end --
periods  of  dis-equilibrium  in  decision  rights  allocations.  As  a  result  most
members  of  the ALSM  had  progressively  less  energy and  time  to  allocate to
HDB,  which  led to  their gradual  ceding of  many decision  rights to  the HDB
manager, and ultimately to their departure once there was a cabinet reshuffle and
a  new  Minister  of  Health  was  appointed.  By  this  time,  the  ALSM  was
functioning more like a caretaker/benevolent board (see Appendix A).  Very few
important policies were initiated or implemented, despite the fact that they would
have been desirable. 29 The departure of the Minister of Health at the end of 1996
coincided with the HDB director reaching retirement age and the appointment of a
new director by the new Minister.  These changes caused decision rights  to be
reallocated anew, a costly and tiring process, which accelerated the departure of
28  All ALSM  members,  including  those who were party  to the conflict  gave consistent  reports  of this
personality  clash  during  interviews.
There are a total of 28 references  to organizational  and restructuring  initiatives  recorded in the
minutes of meetings,  of which 8 are discussions  of major hospital restructuring  plans.  These discussions
were more  frequent  in  the latter  part  of the experience.
18the  ALSM  from  HDB  in  December  1997,  after  an  attempted  period  of
accommodation with the new director (Interviews with ALSM members).
5.1  Decision rights over finance
Once  the  ALSM  was  formed,  the  manager  and  the  ALSM  members
rapidly created and adopted a set of decision rights that were crucial in allowing
the hospital  to  supplement the revenue  coming from the MOH.  These rights,
created in the area of finance, gave HDB the option of recovering costs from its
patients and the flexibility in allocating these funds toward capital and operating
expenditures  in  rapid  and  flexible response to  demand on  the  hospital.  The
impact  on  HDB's  admissions  rates was  immediate.  The  average  number  of
admissions per month jumped from 55 to 259 between 1988 and 1991.  Part of
this increase was due to the escalation of hostilities during the last year of the war
(1990).  However, the secular increase in hospital admissions after the end of the
war  in  October  1990 was  evidence  of  an increase  in  demand  due  to  quality
improvements and to the increase in HDB's  (staff and capital) capacity to receive
patients.  The increase in revenue also allowed an expansion of HDB's  service
mix  (and  hence  admissions  rates) as will  be  shown  in  the section  on  service
delivery (5.4).
Table  5.1  summarizes  HDB's  decision rights  allocation  in  the  area  of
finance.  "Rights  created"  are  ones  that  neither  HDB,  nor  the  central
administration possessed before the HDB experiment was launched.  In all four
areas of hospital management and finance I examined, rights that were "created"
were  exercised  alongside  existent  MOH  rights,  i.e.,  they  supplemented  them.
None of the newly created rights were meant to overrule old rights - one of the
secrets to the ALSM's  success.  "Rights appropriated" are ones that HDB defacto
transferred  down to  its  own  level,  despite their being de jure  held by  central
administrations of the public  sector, such as the MOH, the MOF  and the Civil
Service Board, as discussed in Section 4.
Table 5.1. HDB's Decision  Rights Equilibrium  in Finance
Rights Created  Solicitation of outside funds
Fee setting for services
Exemption policy
Fee collection
Allocation of fee revenue
Rights Appropriated  None
Source:  Author's  construction  based  on results  from  the Decision  Rights  Analysis  Framework  (Appendix  A).
The pillar of HDB's  increased expenditure capacity was the creation of the
cost recovery decision right.  The idea was to keep HDB rates at around  1/3 of
private sector rates.  Fees were set in 1990, and adjusted periodically, depending
on inflation and on the increase in HDB's  expenditure requirements.  Among the
interesting comparisons  Table  5.1 reveals  are costs  of  inpatient  care  at HDB,
when  compared  with  private  sector hospitals  of  the  same quality  range.  For
example, while HDB charged USD22.96 per day in the surgery ward (for the first
five days) and the private sector charged USD12.50 per day, the latter figure only
19accounted for room and board while the HDB figure included the full treatment.
To illustrate, in 1990, an appendectomy involving a five-day stay cost an average
of USD400.00 in the private sector when doctor's  fees and hospital hotelling and
pharnacy  charges were factored in.  At HDB, the cost of an appendectomy was
USD56.88  (USD11.38*5) in  1990, 14% of the fee charged in  a private  sector
hospital  of  equivalent  quality.  By  1997, cost  of  care  at HDB  had  gradually
increased to an average of 50% of private sector care.
Table 5.1.  Comparisons  of HDB Fees with Average Third-Class Private Sector
Rates  in 1990  and 1994.30
HDB/ALS |Averi  .H* I
M  Rates  l  S  ..
________  ________  1990  t 41
Outpatient  Care
Minor surgery  11.38  14.00  K3
1 +  12.14  36.00
Minor surgery  5.69  25.00  K + 6.079  20.00
(emergency room)  15.18""
Plaster service  5.69  25.00  9.11  20.00
Emergency  2.28  16.70  4.86  22.28
consultation
Regular consultation  1.14  12.50  4.86  16.5
X-ray  1.14  14.00  R" =0.12  16.00
E.C.G.  1.14  12.00  3.04  15.00
Laboratory  0.57 per  2.00*  |L  = 0.08  3.30*
analysis  l17.00-25.00**  l  25.00-37.00**
Inpatient  Care
Medical Ward  12.50/Day*  * *  15.18/Day  22.00/Day**  *
Maternity Ward  5.69/Day  12.50/Day***  18.21/Day  22.00/Day***
Newborn nursery  10.00/Day***  6.07/Day  15.00/Day***
Surgery  11.38/Day  12.5/Day***  K = 1.21  22.00/Day***
Gynecology  12.5/Day***  15.18/Day  22.00/Day***
Intensive Care  11.38  60.00/Day***  15.18/Day  100.00/Day***
All figures are in US Dollars, converted  using the exchange  rates of the respective  years.  In 1990 the
Lebanese  Lira was 879.00  to the US Dollar. In 1994,  LL1647.00  = One USD. In 1999,  LL1508.00  = One
USD. Exchange  rates were obtained  from  the Central  Bank  of Lebanon,  courtesy  of Youssef El-Khalil.
* Minimum  cost  per single  test.
** Range  for standard  pre-operative/diagnostic  tests.
***  Figures  are for room  and board  only.
0 Fee if operation  was carried  out by surgeon.  '1  Fee if operation  carried  out  by intern or resident.
Rs (for Radiologie)  and Ls (for Laboratoire)  are set and used in the same  way as Ks. Different  x-ray and
lab procedures  have  different  R and L values.
Source:  Author's  construction  combining  data from HDB  and MedNet  Liban. 32
30  In private sector  hospitals,  the cost of second-class  service (B) is equivalent  to the cost of third-
class service  (C) + 60%. First class service  (A) = C + 180%  (MEDNET  estimates).
3  1  The K system is determined  by the Social Security  Administration  and the Lebanese  Order of
Physicians. It classifies  each medical  procedure  as being equivalent  to a certain number  of Ks (for each of
three classes  of service). The idea  behind  the system  is to achieve  some consistency  and equity  in billing  and
remuneration  for health care.  For example,  a third-class  appendectomy  and normal delivery  are valued  at
50K for all hospitals,  throughout  the country. Today  the third-class  K is valued  at LL8,000  (USD5.30),  and
the scales  are updated  periodically.
20By  1994, HDB's  fee system had become more sophisticated and closer to
the system in the private sector. For example, the price of an appendectomy, with
a  five-day stay,  can be  calculated from  Table  5.1 in  the following way.  An
appendectomy is valued at 50 Ks.  While the private sector charged USD3.30 per
third-class K in 1994, HDB charged USD1.21, amounting to USD60.50 for a 50K
operation.  Added to this  charge were hospitalization  and hotelling fees in  the
medical ward, amounting to USD15.80 per day.  Taking five days as an average
length of stay, the total cost of an appendectomy at HDB in 1994 was USD139.50
(or [1.21*50] + [15.80*5]).  For comparable third-class private sector treatment,
the patient would have paid USD570.00 in 1994.33
Explaining HDB 's decision rights complementarities
This  section will  explain  how HDB  adopted  decision rights  that  were
complementary in some areas and explain why it failed to do so in other areas.  It
will  contrast  HDB's  decision  rights  complementarities  with  those  of  other
informally corporatized  hospitals and  with  the new  legal  structure under  Law
#544.  The data  in  this,  and  similar  sections below  was collected  using  the
Decision Rights Analysis Framework (Appendix A).
Some information on other informal experiences is in order first.  HDB
was not unique in attempting to become autonomous before the law was passed.
Other public hospitals faced the same needs, and tried to acquire some autonomy
under  the auspices of  "support  committees".  Support committees  (SCs)  were
even less formal boards than the ALSM in the sense that they were not  legally
incorporated.  They were of three types:
*  Some SCs were formed by local politicians who saw control of local
health  provision  as an  opportunity  to  gather political  support.  Not
being  subject  to  the  same  legal  and  reputational  liabilities  of  the
ALSM, these SCs were not accountable, neither to the MOH nor to the
community.  They did  not  face the  pressures  of  having  to  create
transparent and accountable systems, and interview data suggests that
some of them were associated with graft.
*  Other SCs were dysfunctional from the outset because they were much
closer to the "alternative career" model of governance (Appendix A),
and  the  members  of  the  ALSM  did  not  have  much  to  add  to  the
32  MedNet Liban is a third-party administrator that assists insurance companies in providing quality
care at affordable costs.  Access to MedNet Liban data was generously provided by Mounir Kharma and
Hugette Daccache.
33  A final, important source of capital HDB received was in kind, and was made possible through the
creation of the decision right to solicit outside contributions.  Most notable among these is an ophthalmology
ward that is the most advanced in the public sector, donated by Lions International.  The cost of this ward
was USD400,000.00.  Another such contribution was the hospital library, financed by USAID  at a cost of
USD27,000.00.
21hospitals they oversaw, least of all in  areas of financial policy  and
strategy.
*  A  third  group  of  SCs  were  "nominal"  only,  created  by  hospital
directors to facilitate the collection of fees for services and functioned
mostly  as  a  bank  account.  Members  were  the  minimum  number
required by law to form an association (3 people) and they rarely, or
never  met.  Needless  to  say, hospital  governance  under  these  SCs
entailed no  attempts to establish systems and procedures.  Decision
rights creation and allocation was random and arbitrary.
In matters related to finance, by far the most important decision right HDB
created was the right to collect fees for health services delivered - included in
Table  5.1  under  "solicitation  of  outside  funds". 34 The  remaining  rights
complemented the right to raise revenue by establishing policies and controls on
the use  of funds.  Combined, these rights (along with  others discussed below)
constituted  a  system  of  accountability  that  was  the  basis  of  the  gradual
improvement of HDB.  Revenue was combined with controls and procedures to
produce improvements that other informal experiences like HDB in Lebanon did
not  establish.  None  of the  other hospitals produced audited  reports,  nor  kept
records of minutes, policies and programs that sought to systematize exemption
policies and fee setting, for example.  In many cases, the lack of systems resulted
in arbitrariness, politicization and/or apathy.
Interestingly, the ALSM's  concern with accountability derived partly from
its quasi-legal status.  The ALSM was a legally incorporated non-profit, however
its relationship with the hospital was quasi-legal, especially in requiring patients
to  contribute  to  the  cost  of  care.  Furthermore,  the  whole  experience  was
perceived  by  many  to  be  illegal,  because  of  suspicions  of  under-the-table
payments, and because of instances of graft at other hospitals.  Combined, these
factors contributed to ALSM members being very careful about the consequences
of  their decisions, and their  desire to  innovate  was tempered  by  the risk they
incurred in innovating.  This risk was just as much reputational as it was financial,
and it functioned as a constraint on HDB activities, budgetary decisions included.
Among  the  most  difficult  challenges  in  designing  corporatization  today  are
perennial budget  deficits  that create technical  inefficiencies at the level  of the
hospital and increase sectoral expenditures and effectiveness because hospitals do
not assume any of the risk created by their investment decisions.
On the other hand, HDB's  system of decision rights over finance left the
hospital with enough maneuvering power to complement financial autonomy with
agility and flexibility, in most areas.  The minutes show a reasonable balance of
clearance or ex post ratification of financial decisions made by the director versus
discussions of  investments  and  procurement decisions  that  were  made  shortly
34  Also included in this category are cash grants,  gifts, and in-kind  contributions  secured  by ALSM
members  and the HDB director  through  their personal  and professional  contacts  - very much along the lines
of the traditional  "conmmunity  notable"  type board  (Appendix  A).
22afterwards. 35 Among the problems with the system under Law #544 today is that
it institutes formal, mostly ex ante controls, instead of accountability, and results
in rigidity at the level of the hospital if the letter of the law is to be followed.  The
reason is that the law was partly written to control bandit hospitals by granting
them "legal" boards, but the drafting of the legislation did not draw lessons from
the better performing hospital which was the leading edge of change.  As a result
of some straightjacket provisions in Law #544, the inclination on the part of some
newly corporatized hospital managers has been to  ignore the more constraining
portions of the system.  For example, while the decrees specify the number and
types of divisions a hospital should have, the newly created boards are ignoring
this provision and adopting organizational charts that suit them.
But  not  all  of  HDB's  decision  rights  were  complementary.  This  is
revealed by the manner in which HDB's new decision rights were shared between
the director  and the ALSM,  and  how this  distribution  evolved over  time.  In
finance, two areas of decision rights were constant over time.  These were "fee
collection" and "exemption policy".  Interestingly, the allocation of the decision
right over the organization of "fee collection" was very much along the lines of
what one expects to see in a modem competitive hospital.  The ALSM helped the
director  set  up  the  system  at  the  outset,  then  he  took  it  over  and  made
administrative and procedural changes over time.  The ALSM would periodicallv
raise questions when there appeared to be slippage, as shown in the minutes of
meetings.
Mostly  a hospital board  function, the setting of  fee "exemption  policy"
was held by the director of HDB.  Initially, the ALSM co-held this decision right
in a very weak manner, by preferring that total exemptions not exceed 1%, a clear
concern for equity considerations, however mildly expressed.  When asked why
this occurred, the director explained that he needed to retain this decision right
because he was the one in touch with the day-to-day workings of the hospital and
because  he  needed to  make  decisions quickly, often based  on whether people
"looked like" they could afford to pay or not.  However, the director's holding of
this decision right, and its ad hoc implementation, were symptomatic of HDB's
inability  to  formulate  and  apply  broad  policies,  and  grow  beyond  its  "small
hospital mentality". Most hospitals of HDB's  size employ a social worker who
implements board policy in granting exemptions, and HDB eventually hired one.
As this analysis will show, there were not many illogical decision rights
distributions between the director and the board at HDB, however when they did
occur,  they  resulted  from  the  predominantly  "crisis-management"  style  of
operation at HDB.  Curiously, the ALSM experiment was begun in response to a
financial and service delivery crisis in the sector, but its informality prevented it
from moving  beyond the "make-do" mode into the  establishment of long-term
thinking in management and finance.  These are instances of decision nrghts that
35  It is arguable that the allocation of fee revenue became "too agile" near the end of the experience,
as ALSM members became less passionate about the strength with which they held their decision rights, and
allowed them to be diluted.
23were not exercised in the manner in which they were first conceived, and where
complementarities were foregone.
Two  areas of  decision  rights  evolved  over time.  The  first  and  most
important of these was the decision right over the "allocation  of fee revenue".
During the first two years, partly due to enthusiasm, partly due to the liquidity of
its funds, the ALSM was involved in lengthy and lively debates on how funds
should be  allocated.  By  1993, these debates had stabilized into discussions of
recommendations  made  by  the  director,  and  decisions  based  on  these
recommendations that included prioritization of expenditures and disbursements
to settle accounts payable, along the lines of the modem board.
However,  by  1996, ALSM  revenues  were  hardly enough  to  cover the
wage bill and there was very little room left for prioritization of expenditures; the
ALSM became mostly a repository of funds.  The reason why this occurred is
partly due to HDB's  inability to plan and implement a long-term strategy, partly
due to perverse competition it faced from the MOH, and partly due to changes in
the  economy  and  gradual  decrease  in  time  allocated  by  ALSM  members  to
fundraising.  In the area of "solicitation of outside funds", the ALSM started out
by being  a strong holder and exerciser  of this  decision right.  It gradually lost
interest and the capacity to carry out this role, and near the end, there was very
little activity in this area and the decision right was diluted. 36
The  informality  of  the  experience  was  both  a  boon  and  a  bane.  To
illustrate, the ALSM considered adopting an important decision right that boards
normally enjoy, but it did not succeed in doing so and the opportunity to benefit
from the complementarity was missed.  This was the right to design long-term
financial policy.  During its first year of operation, an effort was made to produce
a budget forecast, but this was abandoned for two reasons:
- The only ALSM member with a finance background stopped participating two
years into the experiment;
*  The informal status of the ALSM never allowed it to think about long-term
horizons. 37
Indeed, in all areas of hospital management and finance discussed in this
paper, the ALSM was weakest on the planning and strategy side, largely because
of its informality but also because of its skill mix and because of its preoccupation
36  As for the decision right over fee setting, it is clear from the data that  the initial work  done in
setting fee schedules was spearheaded by the support committee, and that the first set of adjustments were as
well.  This decision right was perhaps heavily contested as it alternated between the director and the ALSM
for a while.  Unfortunately, the minutes of meetings provide no conclusive evidence here.
37  There were continual calls to shut down all SC-like activities by central government  inspection
agents during the 7-year tenure of the ALSM at HDB.  The experience of another innovative program, the
Fondo de Desarrollo Vecinal in Chile was similar (Eid 1996, 1999c, 2000).
24with  accommodation as a pillar of the ALSM's  survival.  This accommodation
was of two sorts, one between ALSM members, including the ex officio director
who  had  appointed  the  members,  and  one  with  Ministry  officials.
Accommodation came at the expense of bold development and strategic moves,
and it did not allow the ALSM to develop and exercise a full governance role.
5.2  Human resource management
By the late 1990s, apathy was prevalent among employees in the Lebanese
public sector.  During the war, people had difficulty getting to work, public sector
wages were  eroded by inflation and compressed, public  sector arrears in wage
disbursement were common.  When salaries were disbursed, they sometimes went
to dead people because personnel rosters were not updated periodically.  These
factors encouraged moonlighting, absenteeism, and/or the establishment of private
businesses alongside public sector jobs.
To motivate  its staff HDB created decision rights  in the area of human
resource management  that  allowed the hospital  to  emulate the  private  sector.
Some of the decision rights HDB created granted bonuses to MOH hospital staff,
and others  allowed the hospital to hire its own (non-Civil Service Board/MOH)
staff, compensate them according to market rates, then discipline and fire them for
inadequate performance.  Table 5.2 summarizes HDB's bundle of decision rights
in the area of human resource management.  Between 1991 and 1997, an average
of 66% of the ALSM's  contributions to HDB went toward HDB's  wage bill, in
the form of salaries and bonuses to non-civil service (private sector) employees
and income supplements to civil  service employees.  The remaining 33% went
toward various capital and operating expenditures (ALSM financial statements).
Table 5.2. HIDB's  Decision  Rights Equilibrium  in Human  Resource  Management
Rights  Created  Hiring  (of non-civil  service  staff, including  compensation)
Firing  (of non-civil  service  staff)
Internal  organizational  decisions  (conumittee  formiation,  etc.)
Rights  Appropriated  Promotion  (bonuses to civil service  employees,  and pay increases
for private  sector employees)
Discipline  (mostly  through  financial  incentives,  this was an under-
exercised  function  of the central  administration  and Civil Service
Board)
Source:  Author's  construction  based  on  results  from  the Decision  Rights  Analysis  Framework  (Appendix  A).
Using  the  decision  rights  created  above,  HDB  designed  an  incentive
program that improved the range and quality of care at HDB.  Given that public
sector staff often earned their pay without coming to work, HDB staff, including
doctors who were civil service employees, received an income supplement if they
came to work and fulfilled the service equivalent of the pay  they were  already
receiving from the MOH.  For physicians, this service equivalent was calculated
25using the system of Ks described in footnote 31.  For example these standards
valued normal deliveries and appendectomies at 50K, and the fee for a single third
-class  K was set at USD2.50 in 1990 in the private sector. 38 HDB valued the K at
USD1.14, i.e. less than half of what the physician would get in the private sector
per K.  MOH salaries of civil service doctors were divided by USD1.14 to derive
the base  number of  Ks they "owed" the hospital,  and they would  get income
supplements for any additional Ks they delivered at HDB.
The  idea  was  twofold:  to  encourage  staff  to  come  to  work,  and  to
encourage them to work more and earn "bonuses".  For example, in 1990, nurses
hired  from the private  sector received salaries of  LL120,000 (USD414.00) per
month, and nurses who were civil service staff received an income supplement of
LL70,000 (USD241.00) per month to compensate for the difference.  A similar
incentive pattern  was followed, and updated over  time for administrative staff,
technicians, drivers, housekeepers and guards at HDB.  This compensation policy
was the ALSM's  most significant investment in HDB, and allowed the hospital to
hire an average of 50% of its staff from the private sector, and to expand service
delivery and service mix.  Table 5.2a shows the proportion of ALSM expenditures
going toward the wage bill for the period 1991-1997.39
Table 5.2a. ALSM Human Resource Expenditures as a  Proportion of  Total
Expenditures
Year  Salaries  &  Bonis  e  `s  TdAIL*SM  *)&daris-  %,of  Total
1991  205,076,500  350,815,030  58%
1992  402,432,500  712,284,489  56%
1993  634,120,000  1,029,437,181  62%
1994  896,305,500  1,225,381,642  73%
1995  1,060,616,000  1,537,154,132  69%
1996  1,078,964,000  1,488,575,505  72%
1997  1,535,747,000  2,179,684,701  70%
Source:  Author's  construction  using  HDB  financial  statements.  Figures  are  in  Lebanese  Lira  (LL),
unadjusted for inflation.
As a result of the gradual improvement in the number and quality of its
staff, HDB saw a decline in the average length of stay (ALOS), an increase in the
number of patients admitted, an increase in average birth rates, and an increase in
the number of lab tests carried out.
38  Today the third-class K is valued at LL8,000 (USD5.30).
39  Because of the surplus of doctors in Lebanon, this incentive system worked less well for doctors at
HDB than it did for paramedical, administrative and support staff.
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1985  657  6.4  3,893  6,237  779
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2X9%>p  2,372  5.3  38,566  16,025  1,249
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3,540  3.9  55,207  22,930  2,713
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1E9C  3,248  3.7  65,076  21,825  2,314
3,037  3.5  54,769  19,018  2,028
19p7  3,949  4.0  88,112  25,303  2,763
2,302  3.7  39,915  14,795  1,  711
* Shorter  average  lengths  of stay (ALOS)  are considered  rough  measures  of improved  efficiency.
**  Ecocardiographs  (ECGs) are routine tests carried out before most operations  to examine the heart.
Because  they are routine  they  are good  proxies  for  hospital  activity.
Source:  Author's construction  using  HDB  data.
Explaining HDB 's decision rights complementarities in HRM
By  1993, HDB  had  settled  into a  strong and  logically  allocated  set of
decision rights in HRM.  An initial attempt to give the ALSM  a screening and
oversight role in the hiring of all staff was resisted by management according to
results  from  the  decision  rights  analysis  interviews.  By  1993,  only  senior
administrative  staff  and  attendant  doctor  HRM  matters  were  cleared  by  the
ALSM.  The remaining decisions in hiring, promotion, discipline, and firing were
taken by the director, who would inform the ALSM of his decisions ex post.  The
director was also granted some important decision rights in internal organizational
matters - rights that complemented others in increasing HDB's  service delivery
and  expenditure  capacity.  For  example,  the  process  of  streamlining  and
organizing the stockroom, the pharmacy, and the kitchen involved the stripping of
decision  rights  from  one  area  of  the  administration  and  their  reallocation  to
different, more appropriately trained staff members.  The director enjoyed strong
decision  rights  in  this  area  and  the  ALSM  supported  him.  Other,  similar
complementarities were created in HRM but will not all be listed here.
However by  far the most  important complementarity created in HRM is
one  that  is most  difficult  to  design  in  a public  sector organizations:  with  the
creation of the ALSM, HDB became a residual claimant of its own, newly created
revenue.  None of this revenue was claimed (nor was it technically "claimable")
by the MOH, despite calls by doubtful central inspection and regulatory  agencies
to  put  a  stop to  all  support committee-type  activities  and  collect their  funds.
While this revenue could not be redistributed among the leaders (owners) of the
innovation  --  the  ALSM  members  and  the  HDB  director  --  they  were  free  to
27determine its redistribution within HDB.  These rights were  a source of power,
and they constituted  an intangible, non-pecuniary but  distributable surplus that
combined a sense of satisfaction with pride at having made positive changes to
the  public  hospital  the  ALSM  members  adopted.  When  this  non-pecuniary
surplus dried up as the informality of the experience became more of a liability
than an opportunity,  the ALSM resigned. 40 The HDB  experience points to the
necessity of ensuring that a surplus of some (non-pecuniary) form accrue to board
members.  Politicization and power imbalances can seek to reduce the influence
of  board  members  and  quell initiative, just  as excessive bureaucratization  and
controls can.
Still more interesting, and more delicate, was the pairing  of control and
claimant rights for the director -- a result that is not easy to replicate in the public
sector without  risking  abuse.  HDB  achieved this  by  allowing  the  director's
income  supplement  (bonus) to  increase as the hospital's  cash flow  augmented.
Interestingly,  this  scheme was  closer  to  a  re-distributable  surplus  than  to  an
incentive plan because it was never contracted for.  Not surprisingly, some of the
more successful  cases of hospital corporatization entail incentive compensation
schemes for directors and staff.  For example, in some hospitals in Catalunia a
proportion of the director's  salary is linked to hospital profits (Via, 1999).
While the use of incentive pay permeated the entire HDB experiment, it
was more successful in some areas than in others.  Among the rights considered,
but not fully adopted, was the use of incentive pay as a fine disciplinary measure.
According to interview data I collected, the intention was to grant bonuses only
when they were  deserved.  For example, an attempt was made by the ALSM to
implement  a  system of  monitoring  physician  hours  spent  at the  hospital, and
minutes  of  meetings  mention  consideration  of  purchasing  a  device  for  this
purpose (Minutes,  15.V.95).  However, the hospital director, a physician himself,
did not allow the ALSM to exercise this decision right.  During interviews, he
explained that  he  resisted  this  change  because  he  felt  it  was  impossible and
unreasonable to try to monitor physicians in this way.  Regardless of whether this
particular measure was reasonable or not, the director's  inability to take strong
disciplinary  measures  at  HDB  was  characteristic  of  a  range  of  difficulties
encountered  in  superimposing  an  autonomous  institutional  design  onto  a
centralized design.  There were limits to the range of complementarities that could
be created informally because of the systemic, capacity and process constraints
discussed in Section 2.
By 1996, HDB staff had come to see the income supplement policy as a
right,  and  it  was  no  longer  producing  the  productivity  effects  that  helped
transform HDB  in the early 1990s.  In  addition, the decline in HDB's  revenue
weakened the power of incentive schemes the ALSM was able to offer through
salaries.  It also weakened the raison d 'etre of the ALSM, and further reduced its
leverage  over  the  director.  However,  while  HDB  attempted  incentive
40  Indeed what is remarkable about this experience and the limited experience with corporatization in
Lebanon to date is that there is no dearth of people interested in improving the operations of the public sector,
given the  right  conditions  and  incentives.  If well  designed,  corporatization  of  hospitals has  enonnous
potential in Lebanon, especially given entrepreneurial skills present.
28compensation, other informal experiences did not,  and the new system contains
no provision that explicitly links pay to performance.
5.3  Procurement
All  reports  on  the state  of  public  hospitals by  the  end  of  the  war  in
Lebanon  point  to  severe  mis-matches  between  inputs  required  and  inputs
available  (asset  non-complementarities)  that  precluded  the  hospitals  from
responding to demand in health service delivery (Jabbour 1994).  This situation
was  due  to  delays  in  central  administration  financing  and  procurement,
exceedingly complicated processes for the delivery of inputs to public hospitals
(as described in Section 4 above), inadequate information processing, etc.  Table
5.3  summarizes  HDB's  decision  rights  allocation  in  the area  of procurement.
HDB's  creation  of  decision  rights  in  procurement  complemented  its  HRM
decision rights in allowing the hospital to behave like a private sector hospital.  If
it ran  out  of  certain types  of  drugs, needed  syringes, sutures, or maintenance
services, HDB was able to make the decision to purchase them from the market
immediately, instead of going through the process of requesting them from the
MOH central stock.  As such, HDB slowly developed a reliable and loyal supplier
base  in the market  for hospital  inputs.  HDB suppliers were  so pleased  at the
timeliness  with  which  accounts  payable  were  settled,  that  they  often  made
donations to HDB functions and provided discounts or inputs at no charge.
Table 5.3a.  HDB's Decision Rights Equilibrium in Procurement
Rights  Created  Implementation  of local competitive  bidding
Rights  Appropriated  Medical  consumables
Other consumables
Major  medical  equipment
______________________  Other  fixed equipment
Source:  Author's  construction  based  on results  from the Decision  Rights  Analysis  Framework  (Appendix  A).
Table 5.3b presents  a comparison of HDB procurement financed by the
ALSM versus HDB procurement financed by the public  sector, for a six-month
period at the height of the HDB experiment in 1994.  The figures show that 50%
of the cost of HDB procurement was covered by  the ALSM,  while 48% came
from the MOH.41
41  Because  some of the items  procured  for HDB by the public  sector are sent to the hospital  without
information  about their cost, Table 5.3b required extensive  efforts  to compile,  especially  in gathering  cost
information  for centrally procured  items and services delivered  by the MOH and the Ministry of Public
Works.  Both the  former and current director of  HDB have estimated that the  share of non-ALSM
expenditures  in HDB procurement  has continued  to decline over time, and that the hospital was virtually
completely  financially  independent  by the time it was legally corporatized  in July, 1999 (Interviews  with
Edouard  Abboud  and Edouard  Chalouhi,  former  Directors  of HDB).
By 1995,  the ALSM's capacity  to cover HDB's expenses  became  so well recognized  and relied
upon by the MOH that the ALSM was asked  to settle a bill for laundry  services on behalf of the MOH!
Given the collaborative  relationship  between  the MOH and the ALSM  members  at the time, the request  was
29Table  5.3b.  Sources  of Finance  of HDB  Procurement
Goods  and Services  Procured  ALSM  MOn  Ministry of  Other
Publie  Works
S  _l  ries  and  bonuses  432,395,500  258,184,406
Food  items  5,993,895  28,500,000
Fuels  4,012,235  19,273,240
'gen  and anesthetic  products  14,670,000
tA4enance  ofpremises  6,851,600  6,000,000
Equipment maintenance  14,339,085  2,147,770
i*nu*ure  3,000,000
onery'  ~4,976,320
Awflcaneaus  supplies  64,650,000  4,536,000
rug.  115,394,900  146,337,495  6,341,562
K-raJilm  956,710  19,923,120
Lab suppies  9,994,245  14,665,490
Maintenance  products  &  parts  1,449,555  12,097,250
Water  transport  9,315,000
MIscellaneous  13,444,215
Taal  612,271,660  590,300,371  6,000,000  10,877,562
Grand  Total  Expenditures  1,219,449,593
%af total  DR expenditures  50.2%1  48.4%1  0.5%|  0.9%
Source:  Author's  construction, based on report produced by hospital admninistrator,  Elias Nasr in 1994.  All
figures are in Lebanese Lira, unadjusted for inflation.
Explaining  HDB  s decision  rights  complementarities  in procurement
All results from the Decision Rights Analysis Interview Framework point
in  the  same  direction.  Decision  rights  over  procurement  reached  a  quick
equilibrium after the first year of the ALSM's  operation and were not contested
much after that.  In the areas of medical and other consumables  decision rights
were exclusively held by the director, whose decisions the ALSM would discuss
and disburse on ex post.  These decision rights were essential to improving HDB's
allocative efficiency and they complemented decision rights in finance by giving
HDB the flexibility to respond to demand.  The results in service delivery were
clear.  In the area of major medical and other fixed equipment, the decision right
was held by the ALSM,  which would explore alternative investments and seek
prices based on recommendations made by the director for expansions in HDB's
fulfilled  and  the  amount  of  LL18,000,000  (USD13,891)  was  paid  off  (ALSM  Minutes  of  Meetings,
28.VII.95).
30service mix.  This decision rights allocation was also in  conformance with the
operations of today's  competitive hospitals.
Despite  the  great  leap  forward  HDB  made  in  procuring the  inputs  it
needed  to  operate,  this  hospital  and  its  ALSM  were  not  as  successful  in
complementing procurement  capacity with procurement planning  and  systems.
For example, the ALSM tried several times, but  failed to  adopt decision rights
necessitating  local  competitive  bids  before  procurement  transactions  were
undertaken (Minutes 4.1.91; 10.VII.96).
Several reasons were given for why these rights were not adopted.  The
director agreed that food procurement contracts would have been preferable, but
said that the nuns in charge of the kitchen were used to asking the hospital driver
to go out and buy food everyday, and he was not able to impose a different system
on them, especially given the expansive powers they had enjoyed in running HDB
until recently.  A member of the ALSM said that procurement of generic low-cost
medicines was resisted by physicians who practiced at HDB and wanted their own
name brands of medication.  The hospital administrator said that LCB could not
be practiced  because  they were  never sure of  demand, and that they preferred
getting special breaks from suppliers they knew...  All of these statements point to
the  same  direction:  due  to  lack  of  middle  management  capacity  general
uncertainty,  HDB had  a difficult time looking beyond the short term.  Similar
other non-complementarities  existed in the area of procurement.  But  while at
HDB attempts were made to establish systems, there is no record of such efforts
in  the  informal  experience.  Under  the  new  law,  a  different  set  of  non-
complementarities  exists  because  of  excessive  controls,  and  similar  set  of
complementarities could come about because of inadequate hospital management
hiring and board appointment practices.
5.4  Service delivery
When  HDB  first  embarked on  its  autonomy path, it  was able to  offer
minor  surgery  if  patients  brought  their  own  sutures  and  medicines.  The
sterilization equipment it had dated back to the 1940s (World Bank survey). At
this time, HDB was able to offer limited opthalmological care, had an average of
10 births per month, treated war emergencies and had the capacity to carry out
simple lab tests  and x-rays.  There was no systematic quality control, and HDB
staff had little contact with the community.  The little contact HDB had with other
hospitals occurred when patients were referred away from HDB because it did not
have the capacity to  treat them.  Table 5.4 summarizes  HDB's  decision rights
allocation in the area of service delivery.
Table 5.4. HDB's  Decision  Rights  Equilibrium  in Service  Delivery
Rights Created  Quality control, medical services
Community outreach
Coordination with other hospitals, including int'l  ones
Coordination with MOH
Rights Appropriated  Determination of range of services
Quality control, other services
Source:  Author's construction  based  on results  from  the Decision  Rights  Analysis  Framework  (Appendix  A).
31By  the  end  of  1997,  HDB  had  expanded  its  service  mix  to  include
orthopedic surgery and plastic surgery, chemotherapy and physiotherapy and had
developed  a  fully equipped  up-to-date intensive  care unit.  These services, in
addition  to  abdominal  and  pelvic  ultrasound,  gastroscopic,  and  broncho-
fibroscopic  tests,  changed the  service and  fee schedule used  as an  example in
Table 5.1 into a longer and more sophisticated list. By this time, HDB had carried
out at least two quality control initiatives and two customer satisfaction surveys
which  yielded  satisfactory  results  (Minutes 3.X.94; 28.X.96).  It had  received
visits from at least three public hospitals that had come to learn about the ALSM's
accomplishments at HDB.
Explaining HDB 's decision rights complementarities in service delivery
All  ALSM  members  concurred  on  the  distribution  and  evolution  of
decision rights in this area.  Decision rights over the range of services and quality
control (medical and other services) were held by the director for the majority of
the period.  For example, the director would propose expansions in service mix to
the committee, but his informational advantage gave him significant influence in
convincing the committee of what was feasible and reasonable  at the hospital at
the time.  There is some evidence that during the first two years of the experience
the ALSM took  more initiative than during the latter period in promoting new
services and in  ensuring  quality control through  the administration  of surveys,
especially in medical areas. As did others, these decision rights were diluted over
time and stabilized into a less active role for the ALSM.  There is some evidence
that near the end,  the ALSM had too little intervention in service delivery and
quality control in the hospital, as no surveys were carried out and efforts to start a
pediatric department came to naught.  Of all four areas discussed in this section,
complementarities were fewest here.
6.  Taking stock of HDB's complementarities
This  section  sums  up  the most  salient  complementarities  developed  at
HDB and compares them with  the informal system  as well as with the system
under  Law  #544.  Neither  this  section,  nor  Table  6  are  meant  to  be
comprehensive.  Instead they illustrate key  examples  suggestive of the type of
analysis that  can  be  carried  out  using  the decision  rights  approach.  Nor  do
Sections 6 and 7 seek to present HDB as a model or "ideal type".  Instead, they
underscore that  HDB's  institutional  design  is  worth  understanding  because  it
designed by HDB locally, (not by the MOH) in reaction to market and systemic
forces, somewhat like a firm in a market adopts the structure that maximizes its
chances of success.
32Table 6:  Comparative complementarities
XComlementarities  11DB000000000000000  -j00  --  --  -|  0-  Scs  Law
- I  I  #544
Systemic Effectiveness
Autonomy  + "Right  People"  ++
Autonomy  + Independence  +
Autonomy  + Rational  DR Distributions  +  -
Finance
Revenue  Base + Accountability  +
Budgetary Flexibilit  + Expenditure Rules  -
HRM
Control  + Claimant  Rights  +
Fees for Service  + Bonus  System  -
Procurement
Expenditure  Rights  + LCB
Expenditure  Rights  + Bulk Purchases  +  N/A  N/A
Service Mix
Service  Mix Expansion  + Community  Outreach  +
Cost Recovery  + Quality  Control  +  +
+  = complementarity  present
-+  = complementarity  attempted,  but  not  well  developed
- = complementarity  absent  (non-complementarity)
N/A  = evidence  not available/inconclusive
Source:  Author's  construction.
Take the two examples of complementarities under systemic effectiveness.
The individuals  constituting the ALSM  where by no means the perfect  choice,
however they served HDB well in that they were not politically appointmented,
they  were  not  subject to  political  influence  and  were  successful  professional
concerned about their reputations.  This is not impossible to replicate under the
new system, but it is difficult because all selections are made by the minister and
changes in ministerial appointments will most certainly lead to changes in boards,
creating  the  additional  problem  of  stripping  institutional  memory  fairly
frequently.  An  improvement  on  the  HDB  experience  would  have  been  to
establish  a  competitive  and  transparent  system  for  the  selection  of  board
members.  Name Banks in the UK are such examples.  The experience to date
demonstrates  that  the choice  of  the ministry  delegate  --  a key  board  member
whose role is to align the objective function of the hospital with that of the sector
-- has ranged from being excessively politicized to being an average bureaucrat
with  low powered  incentives.  At least the choice of  this individual  should be
made more carefully (See Eid 1999b).
Also  complementing  the  set  of  decision  rights  that  made  HDB
autonomous, were a  set of rights that made  it independent, beginning  with the
right to  bypass  regional  administrative  clearance  requirements, granted  by  the
minister  at the outset.  HDB's  independence  gave it  commensurate  power  to
exercise the decision rights that made it autonomous.  In contrast, according  to
Provision #10 of the Finance Decree under Law #544, the hospital board has no
right  of  appeal  if  the  decisions  it  makes  do  not  receive  clearance  from  the
33Ministry of Finance.  In relation to the budget, Provision #24 of this same decree
allows the Minister of Finance and/or the Minister of Health to recommend that
the Council of Ministers freeze line items in hospital budgets already ratified and
allocated.  These sorts of measures come at the expense of hospital independence
and are in stark contradiction with the objective of improving local performance
through  initiative  and  innovation.  Similar  points  can  be  made  about  the
remaining sample of complementarities listed in Table 6.
7.  Policy lessons: Benchmarking the HDB experience
The  benefit  of  studying  innovation,  is  in  the  ability  to  discern  key
elements that can inform the theory, and in the opportunity to  generalize from
outlier to concept instead of from case to population based on a random sample
(Yin 1994). This section concludes by benchmarking the HDB experience against
trends in hospital governance to draw lessons for the reform of the institutional
design  under Law  #544.  Table  7 expands  on an  original table  developed by
Shortell (1989) which compared industry boards with traditional  hospital boards
in order to highlight the differences and suggest ways in which hospital boards
might evolve in the face of market  competition.  The more recent  literature on
boards confirms that the direction suggested ten years ago was in fact viable, and
has  proven  to  be  necessary  (Taylor,  Chait  &  Holland  1996).
34Table 6: Comparison of Hospital vs. Contem  orary Industr  Corporate) Boards
Large (14-50)  Small (7-10)  Srnall (7)  Small (5-9)
Broadly  Expertise focused  Expertise focused,  Politically representative.
representative  but inadequately  Possibly inadequately expertise
focused.
Long terms of  Short term of  Long term of office  Short, but renewable with no
office  office  limits
Many  Few comiittees  Few commnittees  No committees provided for by
committees  design
Monthly  Quarterly  Weekly and/or  Weekly meetings and/or
meetings  meetings  bimonthly  bimonthly meetings
meetings
2-3 hour  6-8 hour meetings  2-3 hour meetings  2-3 hour meetings
meetings
Cumbersome  Rapid decision  Rapid decision  Cumbersome decision making
decision making  making  making
Consensual  Pragmatic  Consensual  Unclear orientation, elements
orientation  orientation  orientation  of conflict to date due to
differential political leverage
and lack of definition of
prerogatives
Stewardship  Growth/Risk  Mostly stewardship  Unclear orientation to date. No
orientation  orientation  orientation  fiduciary or legal responsibility
Growth/risk  to mitigate risk-taking
orientation at the
beginning
Process  Results  Results orientation  Unclear pattem to date.  Legal
orientation  orientation  structure is very process-
oriented in key areas
Members seldom  Most members  Members not paid  Members paid
paid  paid
Adapted  from Steven  Shortell,  "New  Directions  in Hospital  Governance,"  Hospital Governance 34:1 Spring
1989.
Table  7  reveals  good  news  and  bad  news  about  the  Implementation
Decrees under Law #544 in Lebanon.  The good news is that boards are small in
size, their meetings  are relatively  frequent, and their members  are remunerated
(although the real incentive may in fact be of  a more important, non-pecuniary
currency).  The bad news about hospital boards in Lebanon is that the law does
not guarantee that they be expertise-focussed at a time when expertise has become
the  single most  important  asset a  board  member  can bring  to  a  hospital  (see
Appendix A, Eid 1999b).  In addition, the system places no limits on board term
renewal  and  risks  creating boards  that  are either  politically  representative  or
politicized, but not necessarily expertise focussed.  The system also transfers very
little financial risk to the hospital manager and board, and results in cumbersome
decision-making  because  of  excessive  ex  ante  controls  (Eid  1998;  Mubarak
1999).  Furthermore, the system does not  yet define the distribution of decision
rights  between  the  board  and  the  director,  a  problem  that  has  lead  to  costly
35periods  of  decision  rights  dis-equilibrium in  some  cases,  similar to  the  HDB
experience  at  the  outset.  Nor  does  the  system define  a  clear  orientation  in
management  or  require  a  system  of  committees  for  the board.  The  default
direction could become a process orientation (Table 7).
In  contrast,  despite  its  many  points  of  weakness,  HDB  under  the
governance  of the ALSM  did not have  a politicized board, it enjoyed  flexible
decision-making,  and  it  assumed  the  full  financial  risk  from  its  decisions.
Furthermore,  by  1994, HDB  had  settled  into a  clearly and  logically allocated
distribution  of decision rights between the director and the board, as Section 5
showed, and it had a clear results-oriented direction, although at times it could not
fully implement it. HDB also had a fledgling system of committees.
In contrast, the current legal structure brings to bare the risks of purely
supply-driven institutional design through slow and irregular implementation and
perverse incentives.  Both the success and the limits of the HDB/ALSM design
offer important lessons when designing a system top-down.  For example, in all
areas of decision rights, hospitals must have a clear distribution of prerogatives in
order to avoid negotiations and the constant need for accommodation, processes
with  significant opportunity  costs.  This  is true both  at the level  of  relations
between  the director  and the board,  and  at the level  of relations  between  the
hospital  and the MOH  and the MOF.  In Lebanon today, this can be  achieved
partly  through  the  drafting  of  the Internal  Administration  Decree,  and  partly
through the elaboration and clarification, to hospital staff and management, of the
model of hospital governance that the reform is looking to bring about.  Similarly,
decision rights in areas of design and implementation of broad hospital policies
are important to define and stabilize early on, to ensure alignment of the hospital's
objective function with  those of the MOH and the MOF, for example.  Board
member maximum term lengths and conditions for term renewal are important to
clarify  in  ways  that  ensure  continuity  without  compromising  energy  and
enthusiasm.
In  the  area  of  human  resource management,  the  HDB  experience has
shown the importance of designing remuneration as an incentive,  and of using
incentives as performance and disciplinary measures, instead of allowing them to
become public sector entitlements or political rights.  The new system in Lebanon
creates this possibility, but the letter of the law does not ensure it will come about.
Most notable, and least well defined is the remuneration of the key position of the
hospital  director.  For  hiring  below  the  level  of  the  director,  the  Decree  on
Personnel has been found to be  too rigid and  constraining, while an important
aspect of adapting to demand entails human resource flexibility.  HDB's  approach
was to periodically  review and set hospital staff needs at the level of the board
(ALSM), depending on demand for services.  A capacity constraint of HDB, and
possibly of the new system is in middle management.  At HDB, this was due to
constraints discussed in Section 5.  In the new system, it is likely to result from
politicization in hiring practices absent the eye of a benevolent minister.
This  discussion also points  to broader,  systemic issues in  satisfying the
objectives of corporatization.  For example, coherence in intra-sectoral policies is
key.  Among the market forces that HDB was unable to adjust to was a perverse
36price  signal  that  resulted  from  the  MOH subsidy of  private  sector treatment.
Because  the  system  of  obtaining  permission  for  cost-reimbursement  was
simplified and had become widely publicized by the 1995, patients could obtain
private  sector care in return for a co-payment averaging  15%, while they were
required to "contribute"  close to 50% at HDB.  This extreme example illustrates
the importance of sector-wide planning and strategy.  Among the important next
steps in reform today, is an analysis of how financially tenable corporatization is
system-wide.  Such a study would include forecasts of demand and revenue and
estimates  of  profitability  across  public  hospitals  as  a  group,  not  just  on  an
individual basis, and would be key to determining the extent to which the MOH
can be  expected to  subsidize corporatized hospitals for a  determined period of
time.
At the hospital level, the capacity to carry out strategic and financial plans,
requires more than a provision in a decree.  Based on the HDB experience, neither
the recognition that such tools were important, nor the desire to carry them out
were missing.  What lacked was capacity -- a problem we risk seeing once more
under Law #544.  Careful selection of skill mixes on boards, but perhaps  more
importantly training and continuing education for board members are some ways
of promoting good performance in this area.
Finally,  the  HDB  case  brings  to  light  the  importance  of  appropriate
decision rights  allocations, versus ownership in the contractual sense.  In other
words,  writing  the  most  complete  contract  possible  through  appropriate
institutional  design  is  more  important  in  achieving  the  objectives  of
corporatization than  the act of converting the legal status  of a hospital into an
autonomous one.  Coherent decision rights complementarities are key.  In the case
of  Lebanon,  priority  areas  in  amending  the  system  can  be  cast  in  terms  of
rationalizing the contractual relationship between the Ministry of Health and its
hospitals, and between hospital boards and hospital management.  Decision rights
allocations must complement, instead of contradicting each other, and produce the
incentives necessary to  improve performance.  Practically,  this  can be done by
relaxing  constraints  in  some areas of the decrees  and clarifying ambiguities  in
other areas.  Another  priority  area is to establish a system that  would function
beyond the presence of altruistic leaders interested in improving the sector.  This
stage is otherwise understood as the process of "institution building".
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419  Appendix A
Functions  of Boards and Directors  in Corporatized  Hospitals
1.  Overview
This  note  provides  a  brief  background  on  different  types  of  hospital  boards  and
enumerates the functions of the model most prevalent and most successful in health care
delivery today.
The  oldest,  most  traditional type  is the  "caretaker/benefactor - philanthropic"  board,
composed  of  community notables  who  used their  influence  to  raise  funds  for  their
hospitals.  Members of such boards perceived the hospital as an extension of their social
interests and derived a significant degree of prestige from their role.
Another type of board is the "representative" board, which became popular in the 1960s,
but has now  been abandoned in many countries.  Members of this type  of board were
popularly elected, sometimes on an electoral ballot alongside municipal  elections.  The
reason why this type of board has proven ineffective is twofold:  (1) local elections do not
necessarily guarantee the selection of "the most knowledgeable" in hospital management.
Instead, they result in the election of the most "popular" at the local level, who may or
may not be the most  "knowledgeable"  in health  matters.  (2) The issues that  tend to
attract local votes,  such as the addition of a new wing to a hospital, do not necessarily
improve quality and/or access, and may even hinder such goals.
Still another type of board is the "alternative career" board.  Typically, these boards were
dominated by individuals who saw their board involvement as a way to further their own
careers - whether as local banker, newspaper publisher, or real estate agent.  Often, such
board members would become overly involved in the details of hospital operation - much
to the chagrin of the hospital manager.  This type of board is similar to what is sometimes
described as a "management" board.
None of these  types of boards  necessarily  existed in pure  form - often combinations
would exist.  What is certain is that the benign, non-competitive environment in health
care delivery allowed these forms to exist and many hospital managers felt not pressure
to  change them.  Today,  this  is  no  longer  true  as  hospitals  attempt  to  reposition
themselves  to  face  the  difficult  challenge  of  meeting  efficiency  and  profitability
requirements in competitive markets without compromising quality and equity.
The model  most  hospital  boards  are  converging  toward  today  is  that  of  a  strategic
director, "corporate" board.  Members of such boards are a collection of relevant areas of
expertise, mentors, evaluators and risk-takers.  Rather than being overly concemed with
process issues, today's  boards must think and act strategically.  Issues must be prioritized
quickly,  linked interdependently  and always  considered in relation  to the  competition.
Rather than just  being a caretaker with influential links to the community, today's  board
42must include  expertise in marketing, finance, law, accounting, economics, medicine and
related areas to guide and oversee the strategic direction of the hospital.  Instead of board
membership  as an alternative career, today's  board members must see their involvement
as a  term that is limited in time, during which they provide mentoring to the director
without micro-managing  him or her, hold the hospital accountable for its behavior and
evaluate  the  director's  performance.  Finally,  instead of being  overly concerned with
structure  and  process,  today's  boards must spell out and continually update roles and
responsibilities based on the hospital's mission and strategic plan, and not on an artificial
and  rigid  separation  of  board,  management  and  professional  staff  functions.  The
definition of roles and responsibilities should not preclude members of these three groups
from working as a team, with a sense of shared responsibility and credit for the success of
the hospital.  In sum, the emphasis needs to be more on expertise, accountability, vision
and strategic direction, external focus and the ability to compete, and innovation coupled
with rapid  decision-making.  With some amendments, the autonomous structure granted
to public hospitals in Lebanon today will allow for all of this.
Some broad  lines  for  the  definition  of prerogatives.  These  lists  are  meant  to  be
suggestive, not comprehensive or prescriptive.
2.  Functions for  the board
*  The establishment and continual adaptation of the broad strategy and long-term
direction  of the hospital  taking  into account the  macro  and  local competitive
environment, as well as sectoral priorities based on the ministerial directives and
instruments such as the Carte Sanitaire;
*  The establishment  and periodic updating  of the organizational  structure of the
hospital;
*  The appointment of senior positions in the hospital, upon the recommendation of,
and in consultation with the director;
*  The oversight  of hospital  management by  the  director  through jointly  agreed
upon targets for performance;
*  The development of a business planl"projet d'entreprise"/"mukhattat  tawjihi" for
the annual (short-term) implementation of the hospital's long-term strategy, with
a view to ensuring the financial viability of the hospital.  The development of this
plan  should be the responsibility of an ad hoc committee jointly  represented by
some board  members  and  some  hospital  senior  staff,  including  the  director.
Adoption of the plan is to be subject to a board vote.
*  The monitoring of hospital performance, through careful periodic analysis of the
following areas:
(a)  Finance:  audited  annual  reports  and  budget  projections  (taking  into
consideration financial targets set by the board);
(b)  Human Resource  Management: periodic  staff satisfaction surveys, staff
performance and productivity measures and ratios, including the director;
43(c)  Procurement:  periodic  monitoring  of purchasing effectiveness and  the
relative (market) costs of hospital inputs;
(d)  Health Care Delivery: periodic revisions of the mix of services provided,
possibilities for expansion or the need for contraction depending on the
environment, monitoring of quality through patient  satisfaction surveys
and periodic spot audits in hospital wards.
In none of areas a. - d. is it recommended that board members actually carry
out the functions described.  The role of board members is in the planning.
definition, timing. contracting out, and subsequent revision and evaluation of
results from reports requested.
*  The setting of fee exemption policies;
*  Community outreach  work, including contacts with philanthropic and corporate
sponsors;
*  Coordination with the Ministry of the Health, through the Ministry Delegate;
*  Coordination with other hospitals, with the hospital director's participation.
3.  Functions of the director
*  Broadly speaking, the director is accountable to the board for execution of board
decisions  and  for  the overall performance  of the hospital according  to jointly
agreed-upon  targets,  financial  and  otherwise.  To  do  so,  the  director  is
empowered by the board to make all decisions relevant to this role, enumerated
below.  As such, the organization of hospital administration is the prerogative of
the director and constitutes a very important "tool" the director uses to produce
the output agreed upon with the board.
*  Finance:  Ensuring  reliable  fee  collection  (no  leakage)  and  accounting  for
revenues,  through the proper assignment of responsibilities for these  functions
within the hospital  administration.  If not taken care of through annual budget
discussions, the making of expenditure decisions below thresholds agreed upon
with the board.  These decisions range from petty cash to routine disbursements
to emergency purchases.  Thresholds are a function for hospital and budget size.
*  Human  Resource  Management:  Within  agreed  upon  budget  envelopes,  the
director  makes  all  decisions  related  to  the  hiring,  reallocation,  promotion,
discipline and firing of non-senior staff.  Decisions related to senior staff require
a board vote.  The director makes these decisions based on prior agreement with
the board as to what constitutes senior staff.  Policy issues such as the strength of
incentive pay (bonuses) and the aggressiveness of hiring policy are also subject
to  board  discussions,  and  so  are  internal  organizational  decisions  involving
HRM, such as the formation of staff conmmittees,  etc.
*  Procurement:  Again,  below  agreed-upon  expenditure  thresholds,  the  director
should have the flexibility to procure  categories of medical  consumables, non-
medical  consumables,  minor  medical  equipment  and  some  fixed  equipment.
Also  below  certain  thresholds  the  director  has  the  prerogative  to  procure
maintenance services, especially if they are of an emergency nature.
*  Health Care Delivery: Quality control, both in medical and non-medical services
is the function of the director.  The evaluation of quality control practices is the
function of an outside reviewer commissioned by the board, as outlined above.
44Decisions on the range of services provided, as well as the relative emphasis of
services provided  are to be  made jointly  by the  director  and the  board, with
careful consideration of the director's recommendations.  The evaluation of the
choice and range of health care provision, as outlined above, is to be carried out
by  an  outside  reviewer  commissioned by  the  board  and  agreed upon  by  the
director.
4510  Appendix B
Decision Rights Analysis Interview Framework
Decision Right  Holder  of Decision Right
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Decision  Right  :_:_X_:_  Holder  of Decision Right
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IDecision  R  i  _______  Holder  of Decision  Right
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Decision Right  H  Holder  of Decision Right
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